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Watkins v. Freeway Motors-A Need to Clarify the Principle
of Novation"
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff purchased a used car from the defendant used car dealership. The
car was defective so the plaintiff brought the car back to the defendant. The
parties agreed to exchange the first car with another one. However, the second
car was also defective. Plaintiff demanded the return of the first car's purchase
price and defendant refused.
Plaintiff brought suit to rescind the sale and the exchange. The trial court
rescinded the contracts and ordered the defendant to refund the purchase price
of the original car. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: There was a novation of the first sale when the parties executed the
exchange of the vehicles. The practical effect of the substitution of contracts is
that the original purchase price was payment for the second car, and "the original
sale is no longer of any consequence."'
As defined by the Louisiana Civil Code, novation is the extinguishment of
an existing obligation by the substitution of a new one.' Important in this
definition is the recognition that novation involves the substitution of obligations,
not the substitution of contracts.3
The second circuit did not make this fundamental distinction in Watkins v.
Freeway Motors.4 The second circuit's decision supports the conclusion that
novation can include the substitution of contracts rather than being limited to the
substitution of obligations.5 While the result reached by the second circuit was
correct, 6 the court's misapplication of the principle of novation could lead to
unfavorable results if followed in future decisions. The following example
illustrates how the court's decision could lead to such results.
Buyer enters a jewelry store with the intention of purchasing an expensive,
unique piece of jewelry for a companion. Buyer selects an item and purchases
it from seller. Unfortunately, the uniqueness of the piece does not impress the
companion who insists that buyer return the item and demand a refund. Upon
return to the store, buyer learns that seller only refunds the purchase price if
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Watkins v. Freeway Motors, 691 So. 2d 854, 857 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
2. La. Civ. Code art. 1879.
3. Id.
4. Watkins, 691 So. 2d at 857.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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merchandise is defective. Seller offers to exchange buyer's piece of jewelry for
another of comparable value. Buyer gladly accepts the offer and the parties
exchange the original piece of jewelry for another piece. However, the new
piece of jewelry is defective. Buyer returns to the store with the defective piece
and demands a return of the original purchase price. Seller refuses to return the
purchase price, but offers to provide the original, non-defective piece of jewelry
instead. Buyer finds this unacceptable and files a law suit to recover the
purchase price of the original piece of jewelry. What result, a return of the
purchase price or the original piece of jewelry?
If the second circuit's decision in Freeway was applied to the above
example, the buyer would get her money back and the seller would have lost the
original sale of a unique, but perfectly sound piece of jewelry. This outcome
would follow because the court labeled novation the substitution of contracts
rather than the substitution of obligations.
Because the decision in Freeway entailed several fundamental legal
principles including the law of sales, exchange, redhibition, and novation, the
analysis of this article will begin with a presentation and application of the
relevant civil code provisions This article will then analyze the second
circuit's decision in light of the applicable civil code provisions and related case
law. The objective of this article is not only to address the problems of the
Freeway decision, but also to provide a clearer understanding and proper
application of the concept of novation.
II. WATKINS V. FREEWAY MOTORS
Watkins purchased a 1987 Jaguar XJ6 automobile from Freeway, a used car
dealership Watkins began experiencing engine and brake problems shortly
after the purchase.9 She brought the Jaguar back to Freeway and the parties
agreed to exchange the Jaguar for a 1989 Volvo GL.10 Unfortunately, the
Volvo also had engine problems that manifested immediately after the ex-
change." Watkins brought the Volvo back to Freeway for repairs." After
several unsuccessful inquiries into the status of the repairs, Watkins brought a
redhibition action seeking rescission of the exchange and sales contracts.' 3 The
7. This article will begin with the civil code because Louisiana Civil Code article I provides:
"[T]he sources of law are legislation and custom." As legislation, the civil code is a source of law
that should be followed when it provides the solution to a given situation. A court should not resort
to secondary sources of law if the code provides an answer. See La. Civ. Code art. 4 which states
in part: "When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court
is bound to proceed according to equity."
8. Watkins, 691 So. 2d at 855.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 856.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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trial court rendered judgment in favor of Watkins, rescinding both contracts
because the cars had redhibitory defects. 4
In affirming the trial court's decision, the second circuit recognized that the
parties had entered into a contract of exchange when they traded the Jaguar for
the Volvo. Applying the general obligation of warranty to the contract of
exchange, the court found that defects in the Volvo entitled Watkins to rescission
of the contract of exchange and return of the original purchase price." The
court reasoned that when the parties executed the exchange of the Jaguar for the
Volvo, there was a novation of the first sale into a contract of exchange.' 6 The
court found that the practical effect of the substitution of the cars was that the
vendee had "paid $10,094 for the Volvo and the original sale [was] no longer of
any consequence."' 7
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE
A. Obligations in General and Conventional Obligations
Before an aggrieved party can recover for damages caused by another, a
legal relationship must exist between the aggrieved party"s and the party
responsible for the alleged damage. 9 According to the Louisiana Civil Code,
"[a]n obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person, called the obligor, is
bound to render a performance in favor of another, called the obligee."20
Obligations may arise from contracts and other declarations of the will, as well
as directly from the law.'
As one source of obligations, "A contract is an agreement by two or more
parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished." 2 When
two parties enter into a synallagmatic contract like a contract of sale or a contract
of exchange, "the parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the obligation
of each party is correlative to the obligation of the other."' A synallagmatic
contract involving two parties creates at least two obligations, so that each party
is both an obligor and an obligee. Each obligation binds the respective parties
to render a performance in favor of the other party. The performances that
14. Id. at 856.
15. Id. at 857.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. In this analysis, Watkins would be the aggrieved party and the obligee.
19. Freeway is the obligor because it is responsible for Watkins' damages.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 1756.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 1757 provides: "Obligations arise from contracts and other declarations
of will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in instances such as
wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of another, unjust enrichment and other acts or facts."
22. La. Civ. Code art. 1906.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 1908.
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extinguish the parties' respective obligations" "may consist of giving, doing,
or not doing something."2
In addition, obligations may be further distinguished as principal or
accessory obligations. The theory that the accessory obligation follows the fate
of the principal obligation, accessorium sequiturprincipale, is the basis for this
general classification of obligations. 6 For example, in the contract of surety-
ship, the extinction of the principal obligation extinguishes the suretyship, the
contract of suretyship being the accessory obligation.27 Another example is a
vendor's obligation to warrant the thing sold.2" The warranty obligation is
merely an obligation imposed on the vendor to ensure that he has transferred
ownership of a thing of value, which value is the equivalent of what the vendor
received. As such, the obligation of warranty is an accessory to the principal
obligation to transfer ownership of the thing. Without a transfer of ownership,
the vendor has no obligation to warrant the thing.
B. Contract of Sale
A sale is a contract that creates obligations29 "whereby a person transfers
ownership of a thing to another for a price in money."3 The vendor has an
obligation to transfer the ownership of a thing and the vendee has an obligation
to pay a price in money.3' The vendor's obligation to transfer the ownership
of the thing is an obligation to give," to transfer a real right3" over a thing.
Generally, ownership transfers from the vendor to the vendee when there is
agreement on the movable thing and the price is fixed.34 Thus, the vendor's
consent that forms the contract of sale and creates an obligation to give
simultaneously amounts to the performance of the vendor's obligation to give."
In addition to the vendor's principal obligation to give, he is also bound to keep
24. La. Civ. Code art. 1854 provides: "Performance by the obligor extinguishes the obligation."
25. La. Civ. Code art. 1756.
26. See Alain A. Levasseur, Louisiana Law of Obligations in General, A Precis 219 (1996).
27. La. Civ. Code art. 3059.
28. La. Civ. Code art. 2475.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1906.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 2439.
31. See La. Civ. Code art. 2439, 2549.
32. See Levasseur, supra note 26, at 7.
33. See La. Civ. Code art. 1763 which provides: "A real obligation is a duty correlative and
incidental to a real right."
34. La. Civ. Code art. 2456 provides: "Ownership is transferred between the parties as soon
as there is agreement on the thing and the price is fixed, even though the thing sold is not yet
delivered nor the price is paid." In general, this article applies to movable things. In relation to
immovables, a transfer of ownership requires a writing. La. Civ. Code art. 2440. But see La. Civ.
Code art. 1839 (oral transfer of immovable property).
35. See Levasseur, supra note 26, at 7. See also 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, English
Translation, pt. I, no. 1447, at 814 (Louisiana Law Institute, 1959) ("this obligation [to give] is
reputed executed as soon as it is formed .... ).
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the thing safe, "to deliver the thing sold[,] and to warrant to the buyer ownership,
peaceful possession of, and the absence of hidden defects in that thing."'36
Likewise, the vendee has an obligation to "pay the price and to take delivery
of the thing."" Once the vendor delivers the thing and the vendee pays the
price, the only obligation created by the contract of sale that remains is the
vendor's obligation to warrant the thing sold.
C. Contract of Exchange
Like a contract of sale, an exchange is also a synallagmatic contract. In a
contract of exchange, "the parties to the contract give to one another, one thing
for another, whatever it be, except money. ..."" Although "each of the parties
is individually considered both as vendor and vendee,"" the parties create only
a single contract rather than two separate contracts.40 As vendors, both parties
have obligations to give. Because "[a]n exchange takes place by the bare consent
of the parties,"4 the parties' consent that forms the contract of exchange and
creates an obligation to give, simultaneously amounts to their performance. 2
The obligations that remain after the parties express their consent to exchange are
the obligations to deliver and to warrant the things that are the objects of the
parties' obligations to give.
D. Novation
While performance extinguishes an obligation,43 novation also extinguishes
an existing obligation by substituting a new obligation." The parties' intentions
"to extinguish the original obligation must be clear and unequivocal."'" In
addition, "novation has no effect when the obligation it purports to extinguish
does not exist .... ,4' Thus, to effect a novation, the parties must meet two
fundamental conditions.47 "The first condition required is that of a succession
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2475.
37. La. Civ. Code a. 2549.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 2660.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 2667.
40. The fact that the parties are considered both vendor and vendee in a contract of exchange
"does not warrant the resolution that there are two separate contracts." Womack v. Stenberg, 172
So. 2d 683, 685 (La. 1965).
41. La. Civ. Code art. 2661.
42. See Levasseur, supra note 26, at 7.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 1854.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 1879. See also 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. i, no.
399, at 228 ("The modes of extinction of... [obligations are]: (!)payment; (2) giving in payment;
(3) novation; (4) compensation; (5) confusion; [or] (6) the termination of the term.").
45.. La. Civ. Code art. 1880.
46. La. Civ. Code art. 1883.
47. See Levasseur, supra note 26, at 199.
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of obligations and the second is that of the intent to novate (animus
novandi)."'
A succession of obligations requires "the extinguishment of an existing
obligation by the substitution of a new one.' 49 A succession of obligations does
not occur, and thus no novation occurs, if a prior performance has extinguished
the obligation to be substitutedS or the obligation is absolutely null.5' If the
obligation to be extinguished is valid, the succession of obligations can occur by
either objective" or subjective novation. Objective novation occurs when
"a new performance is substituted for that previously owed, or a new cause is
substituted for that of the original obligation." 54 Subjective "[n]ovation takes
place when a new obligor is substituted for a prior obligor who is discharged by
the obligee."" Thus, objective and subjective novation require "[t]he introduc-
tion of a new element to differentiate the old obligation from the new obliga-
tion.... A mere modification of a [non-essential component part of] ... an
obligation does not amount to a change of obligation[s]" and thus does not effect
a novation. 56 Novation requires that an "essential" element of an obligation be
substituted.5'
The second condition required to effect a novation is the intent to novate,
the animus novandi.5s "[T]he specific intent to novate will serve to distinguish
a novation from a mere alteration or modification of an existing obligation....
The intent to novate must be specific in the sense that the parties must have
meant both to extinguish an obligation and to change it into another one.""'
However, the intent to novate need not be a subjective manifestation. The
48. See Levasseur, supra note 26, at 199.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 1879.
50. 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 533, at 298 ("If the first debt does
not exist, there is no basis for the novation because novation is the equivalent to payment; and every
novation, just as every payment, presupposes a debt."). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1854.
51. La. Civ. Code art. 1883.
52. See La. Civ. Code art. 1881.
53. See La. Civ. Code art. 1882.
54. La. Civ. Code art. 1881.
55. La. Civ. Code art 1882.
56. 1 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations § 17.7, at 585, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992).
57. See La. Civ. Code art. 1881 which provides in part: "Mere modification of an obligation,
made without intention to extinguish it, does not effect a novation. The execution of a new writing,
the issuance or renewal of a negotiable instrument, or the giving of new securities for the
performance of an existing obligation are examples of such a modification." See also 2 Planiol Civil
Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. 1, no. 529, at 296 ("The second obligation should differ from the
first by a new element, sufficient to distinguish one for the other; 'Novatlo enim a novo nomen
accepit.' Without this difference, the old obligation would continue to exist without change, and the
purported novation would be only its recognition or confirmation.").
58. See La. Civ. Code art. 1880. See also 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. 1,
no. 543, at 302 ("The intention to novate is indispensable, because a new debt can always be created
in addition to the old."); Dig. 46.2.2 (Ulpian, Sabinus, book 48) ("jN]ovation will occur only if the
intention is that the obligation be novated; if that is not the case, there will be two obligations.").
59. Levasseur, supra note 26, at 202.
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parties' actions can imply the intent to novate when the unequivocal result of
such actions is to substitute a new obligation for an earlier one that is extin-
guished.6 ° "The intention to novate may be shown by the character of the
transaction, and by the facts and circumstances surrounding it, as well as by the
terms of the agreement itself."
'6
'
IV. APPLICATION OF CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS TO THE FREEWAY DECISION
Both the trial court and the court of appeals recognized that vendee Watkins
and vendor Freeway entered into a contract of sale when Watkins purchased the
Jaguar from Freeway. 62 The parties' agreement on the thing and the price gave
rise to a binding, synallagmatic contract of sale.63 This contract created
reciprocal obligations for both parties." The vendee had an obligation to pay
the price and to take delivery of the car.65 The vendor had an obligation to
transfer ownership and to deliver the car."6 Because ownership of the car
transferred upon the parties' consent,67  Freeway's consent simultaneously
extinguished its obligation to give.68  Freeway's making the car available to
Watkins also extinguished its obligation to deliver.69 Likewise, Watkins'
obligations to pay the price and to take delivery were extinguished by her
payment and taking possession of the car. 0 Thus, Freeway's obligation to
warrant to Watkins ownership, peaceful possession, and the absence of hidden
defects in the car was the only obligation created by the contract of sale that
remained."
The trial court and the court of appeals also recognized that the parties
entered into a contract of exchange when Watkins traded the defective Jaguar for
the Volvo. 72 The parties' consent that gave rise to the contract of exchange
also operated as the performance of their obligations to give."3 As stated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Ellerson v. Scott, "[t]here is no state of suspension
60. 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 544, at 302.
61. Placid Oil Co. v. Taylor, 325 So. 2d 313, 316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
62. Watkins v. Freeway, 691 So. 2d 854, 856 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
63. See La. Civ. Code art. 2439.
64. See La Civ. Code art. 1908.
65. See La. Civ. Code-art. 2549.
66. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2439, 2475.
67. See La. Civ. Code art. 2456.
68. See Levasseur, supra note 26, at 7.
69. See La. Civ. Code art. 2477, comment (b) which provides: "that delivery is the transfemng
of the thing sold into the power and possession of the buyer or the making of the thing available to
the buyer by the seller."
70. See La. Civ. Code art. .2549. Watkins' extinguished her obligation to pay the price
assuming Freeway did not extend any credit to Watkins for the purchase price.
71. See La. Civ. Code art. 2475.
72. Watkins v. Freeway, 691 So. 2d 854, 857 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997). See also La. Civ. Code
art. 2660.
73. See La. Civ. Code art. 2661.
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for ownership of automobiles in a car trade. Ownership changes simultaneously
upon agreement of the parties. 7 4 Watkins became the owner of the Volvo and
Freeway became the owner of the Jaguar through a single conventional
agreement and not two separate and successive contracts."
Recognizing that the Volvo had redhibitory defects76 and that the sales
articles governing redhibition alsoapply to contracts of exchange," the second
circuit concluded that the contract of exchange should be rescinded because of
the defects in the Volvo.78 The court held:
When the parties executed the exchange of the Jaguar for the Volvo,
there was a novation of the first sale. The practical effect of this
substitution is that the plaintiff has paid $10,094 for the Volvo and the
original sale is no longer of any consequence. 9
What did the court mean when it stated that "there was a novation of the first
sale" and that "the original sale is no longer of any consequence"? 0 By stating
that "there was a novation of the first sale"" when "the parties executed the
exchange,'2 the court in effect held that the contract of sale was novated by the
contract of exchange. This analysis is inconsistent with the concept of
novation.
Novation has for its purpose the extinguishment of an existing obligation
created by a contract and the substitution of a new obligation under the same
contract.' Novation is not the extinguishment of an existing contract by the
substitution of a new contract. Existing obligations, not existing contracts, are
substituted under novation.'4 However, extinguishing an existing obligation and
substituting a new one can have the effect of transforming the contract that
created the original obligation into a new or different type of contract. For
example, the performance of a vendee's obligation in a sale, which is to pay the
price, can be substituted by a new obligation, the performance of which is to
74.. Ellerson v. Scott, 320 So. 2d 527, 529 (La. 1975).
75. See Womack v. Sternberg, 172 So. 2d 683, 685 (La. 1965).
76. Watkins, 691 So. 2d at 857.
77. Id. at 856. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2667 which provides in part: "All the other
provisions relative to the contract of sale apply to the contract of exchange."; Landry v. Istre, 510
So. 2d 1310, 1312 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) ("[Ihe Civil Code articles relative to redhibitory sales
are applicable to contracts of exchange."); Womack, 172 So. 2d at 685 ("Except in certain instances
... the rules governing the contract of sale apply to the contract of exchange.").
78. Watkins, 691 So. 2d at 857.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id.
* 81. Id.
82. Id.
83. La. Civ. Code art. 1879.
84. See La. Civ. Code art. 1879. See also Dig. 46.2.1 (Ulpian, Sabinus book 46) which reflects
the general premise that obligations and not contracts are novated by stating: "Novation is the
transformation and metamorphosis of an earlier debt into another obligation ......
1248 [Vol. 58
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deliver a thing.85 In addition to effecting an objective novation, such a
substitution of performances has other effects on the parties' legal relation-
ship.16
First, the substitution of performances transforms the original sale into a
contract of exchange. A contract of exchange occurs when "the parties to the
contract give to one another, one thing for another, whatever it be, except
money.""7 In the above example, the vendee gave a thing to his vendor instead
of making a payment in money. Where the original agreement was to create a
contract of sale, the substitution of the vendee's performance transforms the
original agreement into a contract of exchange.
Second, the substitution of performances operates as a dation en paiment"
"which [can also] be considered as a novation .. ."89 As one of the modes of
extinguishing an obligation," "[e]very giving in payment ... involves, even
without the parties realizing it, an implied novation." 9' The obligee to a giving
in payment consents to substitute the obligor's original performance with a new
performance having a different object.9 This substitution of performances
operates as an objective novation.9" However, neither the novation nor the
giving in payment occurs upon the consent of the parties. Because "[d]elivery
of the thing is essential to the perfection of a giving in payment,"94 the delivery
85. See I Litvinoff, supra note 56, § 17.11, at 586.
86. Objective "[nlovation takes place when, by agreement of the parties, a new performance
is substituted for that previously owed .... La. Civ. Code an. 1881. See also I Litvinoff, supra
note 56, § 17.11, at 586.
87. La. Civ. Code art. 2660. The vendee's existing obligation to pay the price in money is
extinguished and substituted by an obligation to deliver a thing.
88. "Giving in payment is a contract whereby an obligor gives a thing to the obligee, who
accepts it in payment of a debt." La. Civ. Code art. 2655 (emphasis added). Both the French text
of Article 2655 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 and the English text of Article 2655 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 describe the giving in payment as an "act." This is in contrast to
Louisiana Civil Code article 2655, 1993 La. Acts No. 841, § I which describes the giving in payment
as a "contract." While comment (a) to Louisiana Civil Code article 2655, 1993 La. Acts No. 841.
§ I states that the revision does not change the law, the use of the word "contract" versus "act" may
have legal implications. As discussed in infra note 95, an act is not always a contract.
89: 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 530, at 297. But see I Litvinoff,
supra note 56, § 17.11 and 17.12, at 586-87, in which Professor Litvinoff supports the position that
a giving in payment does not effect a novation because the giving in payment does not create a new
obligation. This position is premised on the theory that "as a matter of law, a giving in payment is
effective only upon delivery of the thing to the obligee, at which moment the obligor puts an end to
his obligation without subjecting himself to a new one." Id. at 587 (footnote omitted). As discussed
infra in note 96, the giving in payment does create a new obligation, the obligation of warranty.
90. "The modes ofextinction of ... [obligations are]: (1) payment; (2) giving in payment (3)
novation; (4) compensation; (5) confusion; (6) the termination of the term." 2 Planiol Civil Law
Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 399, at 228.
91. 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 523, at 292.
92. See 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. 1, no. 523. at 291.
93. La. Civ. Code art. 1881.
94. La. Civ. Code art. 2656.
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is the "act"" that effectuates both the giving in payment and the novation.
Delivery of the thing extinguishes the obligor's prior obligation and creates a
new obligation to transfer ownership of the thing.9 "[S]uch new [obligation]
lasts only an instant... but the rapidity of the transactions which succeed each
other do not change their nature." 97 The giving in payment also satisfies the
requirement that the parties intend to effect a novation.9s "The giving in
payment presupposes the intention to novate, since, according to its definition,
the creditor renounces his old action in exchange for the one that is given
him.199
While a giving in payment is an example of the transformation of a contract
because of a substitution of obligations, such a transformation did not occur in
Freeway. The parties' performances extinguished their respective obligations
created by the contract of sale.1 As a result, there was no remaining obliga-
tion created by the contract of sale that could be novated.' ' The second
circuit erred in holding that the contract of sale was novated into a contract of
exchange. The parties simply entered into two separate contracts, a contract of
sale followed by a contract of exchange."0 2
95. As discussed in supra note 88, Louisiana Civil Code article 2655, 1993 La. Acts No. 841,
§ I revisions changed the definition of giving in payment from an "act" to a "contract". In contrast,
Louisiana Civil Code article 1879, 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § I revisions abandoned the definition
of novation as a contract as was found in Article 2185 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
Louisiana Civil Code article 1879, 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § I altered the concept of novation by
not limiting it to contracts. As comment (a) to Louisiana Civil Code article 1879 states, "novation
is not in itself a transaction but the legal effect of certain acts," acts which should include a giving
in payment. 1984 La. Acts No. 331, §1 (emphasis added).
While the revisions to Louisiana Civil Code article 1879, 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § I accurately
reflect the concept of novation by not restricting its application to contracts only, the revisions to
Louisiana Civil Code article 2655, 1993 La. Acts No. 841, § I take a step in the opposite direction.
Whether the legislature intended to restrict a giving in payment to contracts, such a limitation should
.not be recognized in light of the expansion of novation to juridical acts beyond contracts. Louisiana
Civil Code article 2655, 1993 La. Acts No. 841, § I should be interpreted according to the original
text of Article 2655 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, recognizing a giving in payment as an
"act" versus the more restrictive view as a "contract." Such an interpretation would allow a giving
in payment to occur as the result of juridical acts. It would also reflect the changes intended in the
expansion of the concept of novation as "the legal effect of certain acts." Revision Comment (a) La.
Civil Code art. 1879. As a result the "act" of giving in payment would also operate as a novation.
96. In addition to creating an obligation to transfer ownership, the giving in payment also
creates an obligation to warrant the thing given. "[Tihe obligation of warranty is not limited to the
contract of sale but is found, in principle, in every case where property is transferred for value ..
2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 526, at 293.
97. 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 523, at 291.
98. See La. Civil Code art. 1880 (Novation not presumed).
99. 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt. I, no. 543, at 302.
100. La. Civ. Code art. 1854 states: "Performance by the obligor extinguishes the obligation."
101. See La Civ. Code art. 1883: "Novation has no effect when the obligation it purports to
extinguish does not exist ..
102. It should be noted that Freeway's obligation to warrant the Jaguar remained prior to the
execution of the contract of exchange. While it may be argued that this obligation could have been
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The practical effect of the parties entering into two separate contracts
becomes apparent when the contract of exchange is rescinded because the Volvo
suffered from redhibitory defects."°3 Rescission of a contract of exchange
returns the parties to the positions they occupied before the contract of exchange;
Watkins returns the Volvo to Freeway and Freeway returns the Jaguar to
Watkins.'" However, Freeway's original willingness to exchange the Jaguar
for the Volvo is evidence that the Jaguar's defects were redhibitory in na-
ture. °'0 The court could have rescinded the contract of sale of the Jaguar and
returned the original purchase price to Watkins.
Although the second circuit misapplied the concept of novation in reaching
its decision, it arguably could have correctly applied the concept under two
possible alternatives. One approach would employ the notion of error as to the
object of the original sale. The other approach would apply the concept of
obligations subject to a suspensive term.
While error as to the object of a contract is generally thought of as grounds
for the dissolution of a contract,1 6 such an error may also provide an opportu-
nity to apply the concept of novation. For a contract to be binding, it must
create an obligation whose object is the cause of the party's obligation."
"Parties are free to contract for any object that is lawful, possible, and
determined or determinable."''
In Freeway, the cause of Watkins entering into the sale was to purchase a
working car, a car that was the object of Freeway's obligation to give. Because
of the defects in the Jaguar, it can be argued that such defects made the sale
substituted by an obligation to transfer ownership of the Volvo or an obligation to warrant the Volvo,
such a novation would not have occurred.
When the parties executed the contract of exchange, Watkins transferred the ownership of the
Jaguar and also the accompanying warranty owed by Freeway. A vendor's obligation to warrant the
thing sold is an accessory obligation to the principal obligation to transfer ownership of the thing.
The vendor does not owe a warranty without a transfer of ownership. Because Watkins no longer
owned the Jaguar, the obligation of warranty owed by Freeway no longer existed. An obligation
must exist to be the object of a novation. See La. Civ. Code art. 1879.
103. La. Civ. Code art. 2520 ("The existence of... a [redhibitory] defect gives a buyer the right
to obtain rescission of the sale.").
104. See. e.g., Knight v. Davenport, 71 So. 2d 388, 390 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1954), in which the
trial court recognized that the rescission of an exchange of one cow for another should have resulted
in a return of the original cow to the plaintiff. However, the court awarded a return of the purchase
price of the original cow to the plaintiff because of the remoteness of the defendant still having the
exchanged cow.
105. See Morvant v. Himel Marine, Inc., 520 So. 2d 1194,1197 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (factory
representative's agreement to order a replacement boat was an acknowledgment of redhibitory nature
of defect).
106. See, e.g., Stack v. Irwin, 167 So. 2d 363, 366 (La. 1964) (if defect in thing sold renders
it so imperfect that the contract would not have been entered into, the proper remedy is recession of
the contract based upon vice of consent.).
107. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 which states in part: "Cause is the reason why a party
obligates himself."
108. La. Civ. Code ar. 1971.
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rescindable.t" 9 The object, the Jaguar, could be said not to exist as a working
automobile, the cause of Watkins' obligation. As a result, Freeway's obligation
becomes without an object and it must return the purchase price. "° However,
the parties could agree that Freeway should keep the price, the object of
Watkins' obligation, and that Freeway would substitute the object of its original
obligation to give, the Jaguar, for a new object, the Volvo. Thus, Freeway's
substitution of its performance would effect an objective novation,"' trans-
forming the original sale into a new sale with a different object of performance.
Unlike the statement made by the second circuit, the first sale in this scenario is
truly of no consequence. Because the Volvo suffered from redhibitory defects,
a rescission of the sale of the Volvo would allow Watkins to recover the original
purchase price.112
A second approach to analyzing whether a novation occurred in Freeway is
to examine whether Freeway's obligation to transfer ownership of the Jaguar was
subject to suspensive term." 3 If subject to a suspensive term, the performance
of Freeway's obligation would have been suspended until a certain event
occurred in the future." 4 Such a suspension would allow Freeway's perfor-
mance to be substituted for another object of performance. This substitution of
performances would effect an objective novation and also transform the original
sale into a sale with a different object of performance. Unlike the second
circuit's conclusion, a novation of the sale into an exchange would not have
occurred.
Generally, the parties' consent in a contract of sale transfers the ownership
of the thing.I'i However, if the vendor's obligation to transfer ownership of
the thing is subject to a suspensive term, the performance of his obligation is
suspended." 6 A contract to sell is an example of a vendor's obligation being
109. See La. Civ. Code art. 2524 which provides: "The thing sold must be reasonably fit for
its ordinary use .... If the thing is not so fit, the buyer's rights are governed by the general rules
of conventional obligations." One of the buyer's rights when the thing is not fit for its ordinary use
would include recession of the contract on grounds of error that "concemr[s] a cause ... [which]
bears on ... the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing .... La.
Civ. Code art. 1950.
110. See, e.g., Smith v. Remodeling Servs., Inc., 648 So. 2d 995, 998 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994)
("A contract of sale is incomplete unless there is a meeting of the minds as to the object . .
Ill. La. Civ. Codeart. 1881.
112. See La. Civ. Code art. 2520.
113. "A term may be either suspensive or resolutory. It is suspensive when it postpones the
exigibility of the performance .... I Litvinoff, supra note 56, § 6.3, at 115. See also La. Civ.
Code art. 1777.
114. La. Civ. Code art. 1778. See also I Litvinoff, supra note 56, § 6.1, at 113 (a term "is a
period of time allowed for the performance of an obligation.").
115. See La. Civ. Code art. 2456 which provides in part: "Ownership is transferred between the
parties as soon as there is agreement on the thing and the price is fixed .. "
116. See La. Civ. Code art. 1777 which provides: "A term for the performance of an obligation
may be express or it may be implied by the nature of the contract. Performance of an obligation not
subject to a term is due immediately."
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subject to a suspensive term."' "In a contract to sell, ownership and risk
remain with the vendor, since a contract to sell does not effect a transfer of
ownership.""... While a contract to sell does not effect a transfer of ownership,
such an agreement does create obligations giving "either party the right to
demand specific performance.""' 9 "It is most important to stress that, although
the execution or performance of the obligation is delayed until the term occurs,
the obligation itself is born and does exist.""' ° Since a contract to sell creates
existing obligations,' 2' such obligations can become the object of a nova-
tion. '
If Freeway's obligation to transfer ownership was subject to a suspensive
term, the parties could have agreed 23 that Freeway would substitute its original
obligation to give, the performance of which was to transfer the Jaguar's
ownership, for a new obligation, the performance of which was to transfer
ownership and make delivery of the Volvo. Substituting the object of Freeway's
performance would have effected an objective novation.'24 In addition,
novation of the underlying obligations would transform, not novate, the
original sale into a sale with a different object of performance.' 25 The
cause of the transformed sale would be the transfer of ownership of the
Volvo.
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly addressed the
transformation of a sale by substitution of the vendor's obligation to give in
117. La. Civ. Code art. 2623 which provides in part, "An agreement whereby one party promises
to sell and the other promises to buy a thing at a later time, or upon the happening of a condition,
or upon performance of some obligation by either party, is a bilateral promise of sale or contract to
sell. Such an agreement gives either party the right to demand specific performance."
118. La. Civ. Code art. 2623 cmt. (c).
119. La. Civ. Code art. 2623.
120. Levasseur, supra note 26, at 42. See also 2 Planiol Civil Law Treatise, supra note 35, pt.
1, no. 351, at 207 ("The suspensive term does not influence the existence of the obligation; it only
retards the execution."); I Litvinoff, supra note 56, § 6.8, at 121.
121. See La. Civ. Code art. 1883 which states: "Novation has no effect when the obligation it
purports to extinguish does not exist or is absolutely null." When an obligation is subject to a
suspensive term, the obligation does exist but its performance is suspended.
122. See Antoine v. Elder Realty Co., 255 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) as support for
the theory that a contract to sell can create obligations that can be the object of a novation. In Elder
Realty Co., the parties entered into a contract to sell a parcel of real estate followed by a subsequent
contract of sale. The contract to sell created the vendee's obligation to pay monthly note installments
which the court found was substituted for a new indebtedness evidenced by the subsequent contract
of sale. The court held "that the parties intended to substitute the new indebtedness for the old one,
and that the old debt, evidenced by the 1961 contract to sell, was extinguished. A novation was thus
effected." Id. at 628:
123. See La. Civ. Code art. 1880 (novation not presumed).
124. See La. Civ. Code art. 1881 (objective novation).
125. Dig. 46.2.1 (Ulpian, Sabinus book 46) reflects the general premise that obligations.and not
contracts are novated by stating: "Novation is the transformation and metamorphosis of an earlier
debt into another obligation ......
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Morvant v. Himel.'22 Himel involved a situation factually similar to Freeway.
Ironically, the court in Freeway cited Himel as authority for the premise that the
contract of sale was novated into a contract of exchange.' 7 In Himel, the
vendee purchased a defective boat from the vendor.'28 The vendee returned the
boat to the vendor and received a replacement boat.2 9  Problems with the
replacement boat also occurred. 3 After the vendor was unsuccessful in
providing the vendee with a third boat, the vendee brought a redhibition action
to rescind the contract of sale. 3' In finding that the second boat had redhibito-
ry defects, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to rescind the
sale and return the purchase price of the original boat.'32
Unlike Freeway, the court in Himel did not find that the original sale was
novated into a contract of exchange. In fact, the court did not find that the
parties had entered into a contract of exchange. The court did not view the
substitution of the boats as creating a contract of exchange for two reasons.
First, the court did not address the application of the code articles on redhibition
to a contract of exchange. The court would have had to discuss such an
application of the redhibition articles in order to rescind the exchange of the
boats on the grounds of redhibitory defects. Second, the court expressly held that
"the trial court properly ordered a rescission of the sale and return of the
purchase price to plaintiff."'3
Like the court in Freeway, the court in Himel also incorrectly characterized
novation as a substitution of contracts and not of obligations. The court held that
"[w]hen the parties agreed to the exchange of the [original boat] for the ...
[replacement boat], this operated as a novation of the first sale."'34 Although
the court concluded that a novation of the first sale occurred, it should have
stated that the vendor's obligation to give was novated. As a result, the novation
would have the additional effect of transforming the original sale into a sale with
a different object of performance. The appellate court's affirmation of the trial
court's conclusion that "the new obligation contracted [by the parties] was
subject to rescission. . ." supports this interpretation. 3
The court's reference to a "new obligation" also implicitly supports the view
that the vendor's original obligation to give may have been subject to a
126. 520 So. 2d 1194 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988). See also Knight v. Davenport, 71 So. 2d 388,
390 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954), in which the court of appeal held that a transaction in which an
exchange of a new cow for one originally sold was "more of a substitution than an exchange."
Unfortunately, the court did not address whether a novation of obligations had occurred.
127. Watkins v. Freeway, 691 So. 2d 854, 857 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
128. Morvant v. Himel Marine, Inc., 520 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1196.
131. Id.
132. Morvant, 520 So. 2d at 1198.
133. Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 1197 (emphasis added).
135. ld. (emphasis added).
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suspensive term. If subject to a suspensive term, the vendor's obligation to give
could be the object of a novation. The parties could substitute the vendor's
obligation for a new obligation, the performance of which has a new object.'36
Assuming that Freeway's obligation to transfer ownership of the Jaguar was
subject to a suspensive term, a novation of that obligation would not have
occurred unless the parties had the intent to novate (animus novandi). 37 "The
determining factor in deciding whether a novation has been effected is the
intention of the parties."' 38  Although novation may not be presumed,', 9 it
does not have to be expressed in any manner, provided it is clear and unequivo-
cal. 4 "The intention to novate may be shown by the character of the transac-
tion, and by the facts and circumstances surrounding it, as well as by the terms
of the agreement itself."''
Did the parties in Freeway intend a novation of the vendor's obligation to
transfer ownership of the Jaguar? Did the parties intend to extinguish the
vendor's obligation to transfer ownership of the Jaguar and create an obligation
to transfer ownership and delivery of the Volvo? Both parties appeared to freely
consent to the vehicle substitution and actually did substitute the vehicles.
Although the parties may not have been subjectively aware thai their actions
created a novation, the facts and circumstances surrounding the event 4 ' could
suggest that a novation had taken place. This result is so "because everyone
must abide by the legal consequences of what he actually and intentionally
does."',
43
V. CONCLUSION
Did a novation occur in Freeway when the parties exchanged the Jaguar for
the Volvo? Probably not. Although the second circuit in Freeway characterized
the vehicle substitution as a novation of the contract of sale into a contract of
exchange, the court's analysis was incorrect in two respects. First, novation is
the substitution of obligations, not contracts. Second, the substitution of the
vehicles created a valid contract of exchange, separate and distinct from the prior
contract of sale.
If a novation did occur in this case, the court would have had to find that
there was either an error as to the object of the original sale or Freeway's
obligation to transfer ownership of the Jaguar was subject to a suspensive term.
136. " See I Litvinoff, supra note 56,.§ 17.12, at 586.
137. See La. Civ. Code art. 1880.
138. Placid Oil Co. v. Taylor, 325 So. 2d 313, 316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
139. La. Civ. Code art. 1880.
140. I Litvinoff, supra note 56, § 17.2, at 581.
141. Placid Oil Co., 325 So. 2d at 316. See also Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So. 2d 356,
360 (La. 1987).
142. Placid Oil Co., 325 So. 2d at 316.
143. White Co. v. Hammond Stage Lines, 158 So. 353, 356 (La. 1934).
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In either of these alternatives, an objective novation'" could have occurred.
Freeway would have extinguished its obligation to transfer ownership of the
Jaguar and substituted it for an obligation to transfer ownership of the Volvo.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the exchange would likely support the
parties' intentions to effectuate such a novation.'45
Such a novation has the practical effect of transforming (not novating) the
original sale into sale with a different object of performance. A rescission of
such a transformed sale due to redhibitory defects in the Volvo would return the
parties to the positions they occupied before they entered into the sale; Watkins
would have the purchase price returned and Freeway would have the Volvo
returned. In that situation, Freeway's original transfer of the Jaguar's possession
to Watkins is of no consequence.
However, neither the trial court nor the second circuit found an error as to
the object of the sale nor that the sale was subject to a suspensive term. As a
result, novation of Freeway's obligation to transfer ownership likely did not
occur. Watkins' and Freeway's respective performances extinguished the
obligations created by the original contract of sale.'46 The substitution of the
Jaguar for the Volvo likewise created a contract of exchange.'47 Because the
Volvo suffered from redhibitory defects, the court was correct in rescinding the
exchange.'48
The court, however, was incorrect in holding that the original sale was
novated into an exchange and that "the original sale [was] no longer of any
consequence."' 49 The court should have recognized that rescinding the contract
of exchange would have placed the parties back into the position they occupied
before the exchange: Watking as the Jaguar's owner and Freeway as the Volvo's
owner. 5 The court could have then rescinded the contract of sale because the
Jaguar also suffered from redhibitory defects. Freeway's willingness to exchange
the Jaguar for the Volvo is evidence that the Jaguar's defects were redhibitory
in nature.' Given this analysis, Freeway would still return the purchase price
to Watkins. This result is consistent with the result in Freeway without
compromising the principles underlying the concept of novation.
144. See La. Civ. Code art. 1881.
145. See Placid Oil Co., 325 So. 2d at 316.
146. See La. Civ. Code art. 1854.
147. See La. Civ. Code art. 2660.
148. See La. Civ. Code art. 2520 (warranty against redhibitory defects); La. Civ. Code art. 2667
(applicability of sales articles to contract of exchange).
149. Watkins v. Freeway, 691 So. 2d 854, 857 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
150. See. e.g., Knight v. Davenport, 71 So. 2d 388, 390 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1954), in which the
trial court recognized that the rescission of an exchange of one cow for another should have resulted
in a return of the original cow to the plaintiff.
151. See Morvant v. Himel Marine, Inc., 520 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988)
(factory representative's agreement to order a replacement boat was acknowledgment of redhibitory
nature of defect).
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Applying the principle of novation and the applicable code articles correctly
is not only imperative to preserve sound legal analysis, but also has practical
ramifications. Suppose that the Jaguar had not been defective and Watkins
returned to Freeway to exchange it for some reason other than to enforce her
legal warranty. For instance, an expansion of Watkins' family might create a
need for a larger automobile.
Upon an exchange of the vehicles, Freeway would owe Watkins a warranty
against redhibitory defects in the Volvo."' If the Volvo suffers from redhibi-
tory defects, as it did in the actual case,-Watkins could obtain a rescission of the
exchange. The rescission would return the parties to the positions they occupied
before the exchange, Watkins as the Jaguar's owner and Freeway as the Volvo's
owner. It should be pointed out that Freeway would return the Jaguar and not
the Jaguar's original purchase price. This of course assumes that the Jaguar was
a sound vehicle and did not suffer from redhibitory defects as it did in Freeway.
Freeway should not have to return the Jaguar's purchase price when the parties
had originally entered into a binding sale.
If a court followed the second circuit's decision in Freeway in the above
situation, the result would be very different. Freeway would return the Jaguar's
purchase price rather than the Jaguar itself. Freeway, or any vendor in
Freeway's position, would suffer the loss of a sale in which it was not at fault
because of the court's failure to recognize that the original sale was not the
object of a novation.
Jason P. Bergeron
152. Watkins would likewise owe a warranty to Freeway for any redhibitory defects in the
Jaguar. However, if the Jaguar was defective when Freeway sold it to Watkins, Watkins would not
owe a warranty to Freeway. Freeway would have been aware of the Jaguar's defects at the time of
the exchange. See La. Civ. Code art. 2521 which states: "The seller owes no warranty for defects
in the thing that were known to the buyer at the time of the sale, or for defects that should have been
discovered by a reasonably prudent buyer of such things." See also Banner Chevrolet, Inc. v. Kelt,
402 So. 2d 747, 750 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) ("[A]pparent defects, such as the buyer might have
discovered by simple inspection, do not give rise to redhibitory relief.").
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